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Introduction 
There exists no public policy in the world today that openly claims inspiration in a 
transculturalist approach. Instead, and following Canada's and then Australia's 
adoption of multiculturalist public policies during the 1970s, an increasing 
number of states have chosen multiculturalism, and in some cases, 
interculturalism, as an important policy frameworks for managing cultural 
diversity.1Indeed, ethno-cultural pluralism is far from limited to only those 
societies that have been major destinations for international immigration. It is, 
rather, a defining feature and a growing reality for most of the world's societies. 
As abundantly documented by the Minority Rights Group, no nation state among 
the United Nations' (UN) a hundred and ninety three members is entirely 
monocultural, mono-ethnic or even unilingual.2 Certain states, for example, bring 
together several ethno-cultural groups, while in other situations ethno-cultural 
groups are dispersed within a supranational region divided among many states. 
Other groups are stateless, with no formal recognition of their existence, while 
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still others feel within them the pull of more than a single national loyalty, sensing 
attachment at times, and in unpredictable proportions, to both their original 
cultures and the cultures of their chosen country. 
 
The fact that national boundaries have never, or rarely corresponded to the 
cultures they came to artificially circumscribe and separate, has all too often been 
obscured by the notion – broadly useful in state building – that something 
resembling a national culture exists in its own right. This is notwithstanding the 
case that such national cultures have had to be created institutionally through the 
careful efforts of the state. Such a vision has notably led us to accept the construct 
– since accepted as self-evident in current and common discourse – that ‘cultures’ 
are at once nationally circumscribed (contained within the borders of a state), and 
clearly and inescapably distinguishable from one another (‘national cultures’). Yet 
it is clear that this is not always the case. National boundaries sometimes separate 
cultures that were once more united (one need think of the quasi states or failed 
states of Africa, for example), and presumably distinct ‘cultures’ cannot always 
be easily isolated from one another since they most often develop not in isolation 
but rather in in relation to, and sometimes in tension with one another. This occurs 
through migrations, conflicts, practices, loans and exchanges of goods, ideas or 
symbols – in short, through relationships. (One need only think here of the 
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Caribbean Tout-monde so vividly captured by Édouard Glissant in Glissant 1990; 
1993; Glissant and Chamoiseau 2007).  
 
At the turn of the nineteenth century the diffusionists of classical anthropology, 
including Grafton Elliott Smith (1919; 1933), and brilliantly updated by Franz 
Boas (1986 [1928]; 1940) presented concepts that went on to have considerable 
influence in the social sciences of the United States and elsewhere in the 
Americas in the 1920s.3 Many scholars, including Bentley (1993) and Chanda 
(2007) have drawn attention to the importance of human migration and the 
diffusion of practices and representations in the history of contemporary societies, 
which have thus come to be viewed in terms of their respective interconnections. 
Indeed, at a time of accelerated flows of migration, cultural goods and ideas, it 
would seem to make increasingly less sense to continue emphasising narratives 
that stress the compartmentalisation of cultures between, or especially, within 
states. It is clear that an emphasis on the relationality of cultures is especially 
embraced by ‘transculturalist’ approaches that stress the ongoing networking and 
resonances among supposedly distinct cultures, not only at the national scale, but 
also internationally. (Benessaieh 2010a; 2010b; 2012; 2013; Benessaieh and 
Imbert 2010; 2011; Imbert 2004; 2010; 2012). 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to address several approaches to ethno-
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cultural pluralism and then highlight how specific Canadian public institutions, in 
charge of promoting a sense of national culture, are in practice adopting policies 
of transcultural orientations that have the potential to undermine the traditional 
essentialist approaches to culture. In doing so, I will more specifically propose to 
better conceptually distinguish between the concepts of monoculturalism, 
interculturalism, multiculturalism, and transculturalismmonoculturalism. This will 
follow with an analysis of the ways in which two leading public organisations in 
the domain of cultural identity promotion, Canadian Heritage/Patrimoine 
canadien and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)/Radio-Canada, are 
defining their action. 
 
Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in the World: An overview 
The history and scope of multiculturalism in Canada, Australia, Sweden or Great 
Britain are well-documented in the literature (Banting, Courchene and Seidle 
2007; Kymlicka 1995; 2003; 2009; Mann 2012; Murphy 2012; Thompson 2011) 
So too, more recently, are the interculturalist models that take a critical approach 
toward multiculturalist policies and instead emphasise the preservation of a 
reference culture in interaction with one or several cultures seen as threatening its 
continuity (the cases of Quebec, Belgium, Catalonia or the aboriginal peoples of 
the Americas are often cited as paradigmatic of this perspective, see Anctil 2011; 
Bouchard 2012; Cónil 2002; Labelle and Dionne 2011; Mato 2008). Also well-
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known is a parallel body of literature that examines not the theoretical or practical 
possibilities of the state's management of ethno-cultural pluralism, but rather 
those notorious cases in which such pluralism has been greatly or partially 
reduced, or even more radically ‘cleansed’. Examples of such can be observed in 
the genocides orchestrated by states, or political actors seeking to seize the state, 
in Rwanda, Bosnia and Nazi Germany (Chalk 1989; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; 
Gurr 1994; Jonassohn 1993; Kuper 1981; Semelin 2005). Here again, 
transculturalist approaches are less well-known, as are their more strictly political 
– or, more precisely, their potentially political – dimensions. 
 
I begin with a broad glance at current ethno-cultural diversity in the world. A 
mere overview at the information on ethnicity and other traits contained in the 
Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) profiles of countries and regions of security 
interest4 demonstrates clearly that apart from the most internationally isolated 
cases of Korea (North and South), Japan and the Danish Faroe Islands – all of 
which have an atypically high rate of ethnic homogeneity (exceeding 95%)5 – the 
overwhelming majority of national populations throughout the world are far more 
diverse than one might first expect. Some, including most small postcolonial 
societies in the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Americas, are highly ‘mixed’ (to 
use the CIA's terminology), with well over fifty per cent of their populations 
reporting more than a single ethno-cultural ancestry. This is the case, most 
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notably, on the Caribbean island of Aruba as well as in Madagascar, the 
Dominican Republic, Cape Verde (a historic slaving transhipment port) and 
Brazil, to name but a few examples.6 Between these extremes of relative 
homogeneity and mixing, the vast majority of the world's societies feature an 
ethno-cultural landscape composed of one or two main groups, followed by a 
varied constellation of smaller communities either established long ago or having 
immigrated more recently. 
 
What this data shows (among other things), is that there is significant ethnic and 
cultural diversity throughout the world, which, with the continuous growth of 
legal and irregular migratory flows, is not likely to diminish in the foreseeable 
future. Indeed, a review of figures published by the United Nations and the 
Program for International Migration and Multiculturalism of UNESCO (the 
United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture) reveals a 
marked acceleration of migration in absolute terms. Whereas the number of 
migrants worldwide was seventy five million in 1965, nearly fifty years later in 
2013, that figure has tripled to two hundred and thrity-two million immigrants. 
Over the same period, the world's population had risen from three billion to seven 
billion inhabitants, expanding by a little more than double. Thus, while there has 
indeed been an absolute rise in the number of migrants worldwide, this statistic 
must be qualified by the fact that global population has also risen, with the 
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proportion of migrants to the world's total population not having shifted 
dramatically (at least not over the past fifty years). Thus, while it is correct to 
state that migratory flows have reached levels that are unprecedented in 
contemporary human history, it is also not incorrect to note that this phenomenon 
is not as new or numerically disproportionate as one might first believe. 
 
In effect, while many authors emphasise the considerable importance of 
international migration today, one must nonetheless recall that immigrants 
constitute only 3 per cent of the world's population, which remains largely 
sedentary. Perceptions that migration is on its way to becoming a massive or 
uncontrollable phenomenon should therefore be challenged. Nonetheless, 
countries that are major recipients of international immigration such as Canada, 
the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and Germany, all have among 
the lowest demographic growth rates in the world. Thus, the most dramatic 
changes in recent decades have not been caused by growing hordes of migrants 
moving throughout the world, but rather, much more simply, by the fact that the 
relative proportion of immigrants within the total population of certain host 
countries has risen, which has resulted in heightened political and social tensions. 
 
This is precisely why it is so important for states to calibrate their policies for 
managing diversity. Such policies attempt to slow or filter flows at boundaries 
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(with Germany and the United States representing ‘exemplary’ cases of what 
Philippe Bourbeau in 2011 or Didier Bigo, in various essays in 2011 and 2012, 
refer to as ‘securization’), while simultaneously setting out certain basic rules for 
peaceful coexistence within a population whose diversity can only be expected to 
increase in the foreseeable future (barring drastic reversals in current public 
policies – reversals and models which I will address later in this section in my 
discussion of ‘exclusionary’ models). 
 
With these caveats in mind, it could be argued that international migratory flows 
are capillarising (with the five main countries of departure now being Mexico, 
China, Pakistan, India and Iran; a stark change from the mainly European 
migration that took place in the first half of the twentieth century). Likewise, the 
leading host societies for immigration – predominantly the United States, 
receiving twenty five per cent of international immigration, and then followed by 
Russia, Germany, and Canada (and then the European Union [EU] as a region) – 
are diversifying ever more (UN Population Division 2013). In sum, migrants not 
only have generally ceased to originate in the same part of the world, they also no 
longer move to the same destinations. This was previously the case for the New 
World, which, since its infamous ‘discovery’, had been the world's main 
destination for migrants.7 Therefore, while one cannot state that migration is an 
exclusively contemporary phenomenon, notwithstanding an acceleration in 
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migratory flows observed by international organisations since the 1980s, the most 
noteworthy feature of these flows is that they have truly globalised. This shift 
makes the management of ethno-cultural diversity an issue of ever more 
international importance, and is evidenced by the acute interest shown for these 
issues by both the UN and UNESCO. 
 
From Exclusionary Violence to Deep Multiculturalism: Four scripts  
I shall now more closely examine differing approaches toward ethno-cultural 
pluralism in a national context. Based partly on the works of philosopher 
Wolfgang Welsch (1999) and the writer Édouard Glissant (1990; 1993; 2007) and 
inspired by the distinctively transdisciplinary writing of the semiologist and writer 
Patrick Imbert 2004; 2010; 2012), as well as by pioneering political scientist Will 
Kymlicka (1995; 2003; 2009), I have, in previous work, distinguished 
transculturalism from interculturalism and multiculturalism. I have proposed to 
define transculturality as a mode of drawing from several cultural repertoires; 
transculturalism can be considered a potential approach to treating culture in a 
non-essentialist and relational way, emphasising resonances and similarities 
between presumably distinct cultural frameworks (Benessaieh & Imbert 2010; 
2011; Benessaieh 2008; 2010a; 2010b). Here I will consider four main approaches 
to public policy regarding ethno-cultural diversity. This is, of course, an ideal-
type, to the extent that these models sometimes overlap; do not necessarily exist 
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in a pure state; and cannot be as easily distinguished from one another as might 
appear. The four main approaches I examine are monoculturalism, 
interculturalism, multiculturalism and transculturalism. For purposes of 
illustration, I will consider the case of Globalia, an imaginary country of 
undetermined location, which is grappling with four distinct types of situations or 
political-cultural models. 
 
The first ‘model’, monoculturalism, which I define as exclusionary, is one which, 
whether in its democratic republican version or in its more absolutist form 
culminating ultimately in genocide, holds essentially that an ideal Globalian 
citizen participates in a culture, Globalian culture, which is disseminated and 
validated by the Globalian government. This ‘culture’ takes precedence over all 
other allegiances – religious, political, linguistic or ethnic –, which are considered 
secondary, or, in extreme cases, rival forces to the state, and therefore dangerous. 
The literature in genocide studies demonstrates rather clearly that genocide – or 
politicide in its less extreme forms – occurs when a given community or 
population is voluntarily and systematically defined as the ‘other’ or portrayed as 
foreign, and then dehumanised and annihilated on the sole basis of its difference 
from the community of perpetrators. This is, of course, the most extreme form of 
a monoculturalist policy. The well-argued works of Jacques Sémelin (2005), 
together with the pioneering studies of Leo Kuper (1981), Ted Gurr (1994) and 
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Canadians Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (Chalk 1989 Chalk & Jonassohn 
1990; Jonassohn 1993) describe how such a rejection of the ‘other’ as foreign (or 
extranéisation, to borrow the expression of Jean-Louis Amselle [2008]) occurs 
from not only the point of view of the perpetrators but also that of the victims. 
While none of these theorists appear to link diversity with a propensity, or 
absence thereof, toward mass violence, it is prudent to suggest that for such mass 
rejections of the ‘other’ to occur, there must be at least two predominant groups or 
one majority and one minority group for which access to political and economic 
power is significantly disproportionate. Thus, while such mass violence does not 
appear to occur at all in more ethno-culturally heterogeneous (and democratic) 
societies, it is worth framing the question the opposite way: does a lower degree 
of diversity in a given society lead to a greater propensity toward 
monoculturalism and therefore greater odds that this society will adopt measures 
based on a mass rejection of the ‘other’; from the most benign (for example, the 
state's refusal to confer citizenship on one of its subnational communities as is 
sadly the case of the Rohingyas in Burma) to the most violent, as in the cases 
mentioned above? 
 
The second model, interculturalism, can be described as differentialist (or dualist). 
It occurs as a somewhat sophisticated form of monoculturalism or as an 
alternative to multiculturalism, of which it is often virulently critical. In Globalia, 
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a model of this type would mean that society would be divided into at least two 
groups or communities (ethnic, religious, linguistic or other). One of these 
communities, whether the majority or not, would establish itself as a reference 
point for identity, differentiated from all others, and its culture would be validated 
or embodied by the state. Other groups are then perceived in their exteriority, 
which sometimes takes shape in an explicitly nationalist discourse replete with 
references to ‘others’ and those who are ‘not quite Globalian’. Further, the 
discourse continues that if this community adapt to what is done, and how things 
are done ‘among us’ they will become more Globalian. I have already identified 
two main variations on this model. The first resembles the previous model in its 
potential for exclusionism and violence. Illustrative examples of this form of 
interculturalism can be found in South Africa's experience of apartheid (1948-
1991) or in black slavery in the Americas, in which whites and non-whites were 
institutionally separated by the highest possible racial wall, with whites accorded 
crushing predominance over non-whites in matters of political, economic and 
cultural power. The ethnic ‘identity card’ policies in Rwanda and, even more so, 
the genocide of Tutsis in 1963 and 1994 in Rwanda, also illustrate, even more 
radically, this exclusionist interculturalism. This finds expression in a discourse 
advocating the return to or maintenance of a communitarian unit reflecting the 
purity of a people's identity (a discourse and imagery highlighted by Sémelin 
[2005] in his comparative analysis of Rwanda, Bosnia and Nazi Germany). We 
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are dealing here, in other words, with a typically monoculturalist discourse that 
finds expression in an interculturalist framework. 
 
In its second accepted meaning, the interculturalist model shifts away from 
monoculturalism and moves closer to multiculturalism. The emphasis is not on 
exclusion of the ‘other’ or an idealised return to a ‘pure’ identity. It is, rather, on 
the relationship between, on the one hand, the (majority or minority) reference 
group that enjoys validation and support from the state and, on the other hand, the 
other groups, which, to return to our hypothetical country, are indistinguishably 
labeled as ‘neo-Globalians’ or ‘not quite Globalians’. In a democratic context, this 
form of interculturalism posits that ethno-cultural diversity should be managed to 
foster greater harmony by emphasising dialogue, understanding, or at least, 
tolerance between Globalians and neo-Globalians, while reiterating a central role 
for Globalian values, memory and culture, which are preserved and promoted 
nationwide. In the case of Quebec, I have already offered exhaustive analyses of 
the material submitted to the Bouchard-Taylor Commission's extraordinary public 
consultation led by historian Gérard Bouchard and philosopher Charles Taylor in 
2007 and 2008 (Benessaieh & Imbert 2011; Benessaieh 2012; Bouchard and 
Taylor 2008; also Robin 2011). There are many examples of official 
interculturalism in the world, this very notion having arisen, as Micheline Labelle 
notes in her examination of these issues in the Quebec context (Labelle 2008; 
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Labelle & Dionne 2011), from the EU's integration process. Other writers have 
used the concept mainly to describe aboriginal issues (Mato 2008; UNESCO 
2009). For several years, UNESCO has lent growing credence to this notion, 
sprinkling it abundantly throughout its annual reports and analysis documents 
(Benessaieh & Imbert 2011). 
 
The third model of interest, multiculturalism, which I call pluralist, remains rather 
poorly understood outside of the societies that have adopted it as official public 
policy (such as Canada, Australia, Great Britain or Sweden). In Globalia, the 
multicultural model would see citizens conversing and moving about freely, each 
dressed for the occasion either in standard issue Globalian garb or in clothing 
highlighting their other-than-Globalian origins. In respect to this, however, and as 
Kymlicka argues in his recent paper (2010), multiculturalism is not merely a 
celebration of ethno-cultural diversity that allows citizens of post-industrial 
societies to taste pierogies, enjoy a Turkish bath, wear a ceremonial kimono or 
dance to Bangra music at home or elsewhere. While such increased diversity of 
cultural goods is indeed one aspect of multiculturalism, understanding it in this 
way is reductionist. Other highly influential critics, notably Neil Bissoondath 
(1994) in Selling Illusions, have argued that multiculturalist policies lead to 
cultural ghettoisation by encouraging minority communities to retreat to their 
ancient traditions and illiberal customs. For Bissoondath, this leads to tepid 
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coexistence, rather than true integration of recently arrived communities. Still 
others have suggested, particularly Yasmeen  Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel 
(2002) in Selling Diversity, that multiculturalism accentuates social isolation 
while not remediating to the political under-representation of communities drawn 
from immigration. This renders banal and depoliticises their cultural practices, 
which are kept alive outside of shared public space and merely tolerated since 
they are so rarely sought out. For Kymlicka, however, these criticisms represent 
an extreme caricature. What counts, he argues, is not so much the practice or 
pitfalls of multiculturalism, but much more importantly, that it is the only 
available political and theoretical model that reconciles democratic citizenship 
with fundamental human rights. As he puts it, ‘multiculturalism is first and 
foremost about developing new models of democratic citizenship, grounded in 
human rights ideals, to replace earlier uncivil and undemocratic relations of 
hierarchy and exclusion’ (Kymlicka 2010, p.101). 
 
Transculturalism, the final model and which can be described as relationalist, 
echoes some aspects of the preceding models but criticises the way they conceive 
of culture and thus proposes an alternative. Indeed, the three previously described 
models all share a premise that cultures are separable, stable and impermeable to 
one another; a premise no doubt tied to the methodological nationalism vividly 
analysed by Ulrich Beck, Andréas Wimmer and Nina G. Schiller (Beck 2002; 
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2004a; 2004b; Wimmer 2009; Wimmer & Schiller 2002), which frames the world 
in terms of divisions and boundaries. By contrast, the transculturalist framework 
does not deny the existence of boundaries or distinctions between cultures, and 
pays greater attention to points of resonance, openings and mutual 
transformations arising from encounters and relations among culturally 
differentiated individuals and communities. It is a framework close to those of 
‘métissage’, ‘creolisation’ or ‘hybridisation’ explored by cultural studies 
literatures, yet the terms ‘transculturation’ and ‘transculturalism’ are privileged 
because they keep visible the notion of ‘culture’ while terminologically 
contrasting with those of mono, inter or multiculturalism. In the continuum of 
‘models’, transculturalism represents a dense or deepened version of 
multiculturalism which sets out conditions for pluralism and for harmonious 
social ties that are respectful of fundamental human rights values (such as gender 
equality, non-violence, civism and democracy, as noted by Kymlicka [2010]). It 
nonetheless continues to consider that cultures can be differentiated, declining to 
prescribe how. Beyond coexistence, ethno-cultural communities should engage in 
dialogue, and transform themselves or react to the new reference points that arise 
from these encounters. Under this model, a Globalian education system might put 
special emphasis on the acquisition of languages used domestically or elsewhere. 
History courses, for example, would not emphasise the memories or heritage of a 
homeland, but rather a collective imagining of the founding principles of the 
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country based on encounters among its citizens. Globalia's national museum, 
radio and television networks would likewise promote not a remembered past 
vaunting the merits of an original bygone entity, but rather a mobile, pluralist and 
moving present centred on the emergence of a collective ‘us’ oriented toward the 
future. 
 
With these four scripts now having been outlined in the broadest possible terms, it 
should be stressed again that they have been distinguished from one another here 
for reasons of conceptual clarity. In reality, they sometimes overlap and hence 
cannot always clearly be differentiated (with the exception, of course, of the first 
and the last models, which are diametrically opposed to one another, both 
conceptually and practically). Having described these models as exclusionist, 
differentialist, pluralist and relationalist, I will now examine the Canadian case 
more closely to better delineate the approaches being discussed. 
 
The Canadian Case: National identity in data and discourse 
Canada is notable for its promotion of (explicitly multiculturalist) cultural 
pluralism rather than a national identity anchored in, or historically shared by, an 
exclusive or majority group. This pluralist, inclusive emphasis can be better 
understood when one considers that Canada, together with Australia, constitutes 
the world's most pluricultural society (that is, ethno-culturally diversified in 
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demographic terms). Alongside its aboriginal population (rarely visible in 
multiculturalism statistics), more than one-fifth of Canada's present day 
population is made up of immigrants8 – people born outside the national territory 
– and that proportion grows when one considers the substantial number of 
Canadians of second, third and additional generations who are descendants of 
immigrants.9 Within twenty years, authorities predict that Canada's populations of 
South Asian and Chinese origins will constitute the largest ethno-cultural minority 
groups in the country. By 2031, almost half (46%) of Canada's population will be 
able to trace its origins back to first or second generation immigration, and three 
out of every ten citizens will belong to visible minorities, according to figures 
from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (published in a study by Statistics 
Canada in Caron Malenfant, Lebel and Martel  2010). In absolute terms, this 
means at least seven to eight million people in total, the approximate equivalent of 
the present day population of Quebec or Paraguay, or more than six times the 
population of the cosmopolitan island nation of Trinidad and Tobago. It should be 
noted that this estimate is probably well below the true figure. If one were to 
include  ‘invisible minorities’ such as children of second and further generations 
of immigrants, aboriginal people with or without their ‘status’, irregular 
immigrants and those awaiting some sort of formal status, as well as all the 
expatriates and globetrotters whose temporary stays can last many years, the total 
would most certainly be significantly higher. 
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CBC/Radio Canada and Canadian Heritage: Fostering national identity 
In light of the size of Canada's ethno-cultural minority populations, there exists, 
alongside the work done by Citizenship and Immigration Canada in overseeing 
arrivals and departures, a dedicated government ministry. The Department of 
Canadian Heritage (known as PCH, for Patrimoine canadien/Canadian Heritage), 
is explicitly devoted to promoting Canadian ‘national identity’. This department, 
which is mandated to promote and preserve national cultural diversity, acts in 
pursuit of these goals primarily through its own programmes and through the state 
broadcaster CBC/Radio-Canada.10 Comprehensive analyses of policy shifts at 
Canadian Heritage, formed in 1936, and of programming trends at CBC/Radio-
Canada since its inception in 1993 (which broadcasts content that is ninety nine 
per cent Canadian in a total of fifteen languages, including eight aboriginal 
languages, on a daily basis [CBC/Radio-Canada 2010] ) have yet to be 
undertaken. Nonetheless, some key distinguishing features can be noted. 
Canadian Heritage defines its broad strategic orientations in these terms:  
We encourage a strong Canadian identity through active and engaged 
citizenship, and recognize that Canada is made stronger by its French- and 
English-language communities, Aboriginal communities, and the broader 
pluralistic communities. (Canadian Heritage 2013)  
As for Radio-Canada, it asserts in its 2010-2015 strategic plan (CBC/Radio-
Canada 2010) that it ‘will continue to produce shows that contribute to the 
shaping of a shared national identity ... We will present a greater diversity of 
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voices on air and will do more to reflect the country's diversity in our 
programming ...’.  What is noteworthy in these two mission statements are the 
recurring terms ‘pluralism’, ’communities’ (in the plural), ‘identity’, and, of 
course, ‘diversity’. Indeed, both statements are steeped in the discourse of official 
multiculturalism as articulated by political philosopher Kymlicka in his various 
published works (Kymlicka 1995; 2003; 2009; 2010). At first glance, then, 
Canadian policy appears firmly rooted within the pluralist model laid out in the 
previous section.  
 
Yet beyond official discourse, a closer analysis of the way in which Canadian 
Heritage and Radio-Canada carry out their respective missions reveals that their 
practice of multiculturalism goes well beyond a simple cultivation of diversity or 
civic tolerance while respecting fundamental human rights. Indeed, such an 
examination reveals practices that are far removed from what critics such as 
Bissoondath have dismissed as the ‘ghettoization’(1994) of the Canadian cultural 
landscape. Such critics contend that official multiculturalism policies encourage 
each cultural community to confine itself in its authenticity, its feathers, its 
language or drums, and thus to isolate itself socially and politically from the 
country's two main linguistic and cultural communities (Anglophone and 
francophone Canadians). Indeed, to take the case of Radio-Canada in Quebec and 
its longstanding policy of promoting Canadian artists and creators, it is apparent 
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that few performers of colour or with other-than-Québécois accents appear in its 
serialised television, variety or news shows.11 
 
Yet, on the other hand, programmes on the French language network's three radio 
stations (Espace Musique 100.7 FM, Première Chaine 95.10 FM, and Radio 
Canada International, via satellite) have for years offered considerable 
prominence to Quebec hosts and artists of diverse origins, and to world music – 
be it Nova Scotia folk or Anglo-Saxon indie rock – that is not on heavy rotation at 
other Quebec outlets. This policy of culturally diverse broadcast content, one 
might say of deep pluralism, is central to the broadcaster's distinctive audio 
identity and is more in keeping with transculturalism than multiculturalism, to 
return to the four models discussed earlier. This is deep rooted pluralism, quite 
distinct from the vast multihued collage of compartmentalised content that a 
multiculturalist model might have offered. What is presented is a dynamic, 
synergistic relationship among cultural productions drawing on a variety of 
traditions and musical styles from around the world and the outcome is a 
representation of Canadian cultural identity seen in its many facets. 
 
I will now examine the case of Canadian Heritage (PCH), the department 
responsible for promoting Canadian identity. PCH oversees five departmental 
bodies including the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
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Commission, along with an administrative tribunal for the export of cultural 
goods and ten state corporations including the Canada Council for the Arts. 
Among PCH's main responsibilities are the implementation of multiculturalism 
legislation through the financing and promotion of arts and culture related 
activities. Other topics for which it has responsibility include material and 
immaterial heritage, cultural diversity rights (including the rights of aboriginal 
people and women), official languages, commemorations and celebrations, and 
sports. Policies supporting immigrant origin communities' cultural and artistic 
activities appear to be PCH's main area of involvement in the promotion of 
diversity and of a vision of multiculturalism. Yet as in the case of CBC/Radio-
Canada – and contrary to the claims of multiculturalism's detractors – it appears 
that PCH's action cannot be reduced merely to encouraging communities to 
continue emphasising their ancestral or heritage practices. Indeed, an examination 
of the department's activities in this area suggests that the projects it supports do 
not, as its critics contend, keep communities separated from one another and thus 
from Canada's two official languages and cultures; these communities are not 
structurally ostracised by a multiculturalist regime which, as critics would have it, 
aims precisely to isolate them from diversity and difference by emphasising their 
solitariness and specificity. 
 
On the contrary, as Marie McAndrew, Denise Helly and  Caroline Tessier (2005) 
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note, PCH's work supporting festivals and cultural events, for example, has 
substantially changed over the past thirty years. PCH has gradually cast aside its 
previous approach, which once helped mono-ethnic communities to carry out 
their cultural and artistic projects separately. For example, previously Senegalese 
or Egyptian origin citizens were encouraged to hold separate Senegalese or 
Egyptian activities at an event, and old stock Quebecers likewise were provided 
with financial assistance to hold their own parties. PCH's more recent approach, 
which needs further investigation through detailed fieldwork, no longer favours 
such initiatives. It instead encourages cultural and artistic projects that can 
demonstrate that they are the outcome of a federation or alliance or, at the very 
least, an interaction among many ethno-cultural groups. What is being espoused 
here? In McAndrew, Helly and Tessier’s (2005) comprehensive study of the shifts 
in financing of ethno-cultural organizations by PCH the following two key facts 
are noted: 
We note, first, a significant expansion of multiethnic entities that has 
come, for all intents and purposes, at the expense of mono-ethnic 
organizations. From 1983 to 2002, their respective share [of PCH 
financing] went from 41.2% to 56.0% and from 36.0% to 17.7%, … We 
also note, as one might expect, that among mono-ethnic organizations, 
those serving European-origin populations have seen a drastic decline [in 
financing], while organizations that have arisen within visible minority 
groups or which bring together specific communities defined by a broader 
marker than just ethnic origin have held on to their gains, despite the over-
all decline in this category. (McAndrew, Helly & Tessier 2005, p.12) 
The study also notes many underlying trends that are still in effect today. These 
were first observed in the 1990s, even though PCH's total budget stagnated over 
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that decade (despite a major inflow of new immigrants) and notably, this budget 
has been, more recently, drastically reduced after the Conservatives' rise to power 
in 2006 (they still hold office in late 2013, at the time of editing this chapter for 
publication). These underlying trends are: a major increase in PCH's financing of 
cultural organisations involved in anti-racism work; a substantial expansion of 
initiatives for institutional adaptation and the fostering of understanding between 
minority and majority cultures; a significant drop in support for integration 
projects and those encouraging minorities to participate in their (mono-ethnic) 
associations; and, finally, the virtual disappearance of support for initiatives to 
support minority languages and cultures. 
 
What should one conclude from these enlightening findings? First, that the claim 
regarding Canadian multicultural initiatives promoting the ghettoisation of ethno-
cultural communities is broadly contradicted by the type of projects and recipients 
that PCH supports. With a sharp decline in funding for monocultural 
organisations' initiatives and a rise in financing for projects originating in more 
pluricultural entities, communities have been, ‘more than ever, encouraged to 
make contact with all other groups on the one hand, and, to interact with society 
as a whole, on the other’ (McAndrew, Helly & Tessier 2005, p.20). Second, 
criticism to the effect that multiculturalism policy seeks to encourage minority 
communities' folklore or ancestral practices is also broadly contradicted. This can 
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be argued because of the major decline in funding for minority languages and 
cultures, to the benefit of broader or more socially oriented projects seeking 
improved understanding among minority cultures, especially between these 
cultures and the majority cultures of English and French Canada. 
 
Thus, in terms of the previously discussed conceptual framework, it is clear in the 
cases of state broadcaster CBC/Radio Canada and the Canadian Heritage 
department (PCH) that: (1) they are not involved in promoting exclusionist 
monoculturalism; (2) differentialist interculturalism is hardly in evidence here 
either; (3) numerous references are made to pluralist multiculturalism; and (4) this 
is nonetheless intended to foster integration as well as relational and potentially 
synergistic goals, all of which are more broadly in keeping with the 
transculturalist approach that I have defined above. This fourth approach must not 
be understood as being in radical opposition to the three previous models. It is 
conceptually (or, more precisely, epistemologically) distinct by virtue of being at 
odds with the other models because it is anchored in a relational and dynamic 
understanding of culture; it can be considered an offshoot of the multiculturalist 
model which it deepens and densifies in prescriptive and practical directions. It is 
no longer a simple presentation of diversity, but rather entering into a relationship 
with it (hence my use of the term ‘deep multiculturalism’). Indeed, this fourth 
model proposes such an approach because what is at issue is not the cultivation of 
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folklore or the encouragement of isolated practices that allow each minority group 
to flourish at the margins of broader society. Only more advanced fieldwork 
involving in-depth interviews with key actors in the senior civil service, cultural 
agencies and nongovernmental and ethno-cultural organisations, together with a 
documentary review of specialised reports and briefs detailing the main elements 
of multiculturalism policy developed since 1971, would allow a more nuanced 
analysis than we have here. This would enable better understanding of the range 
of transculturalist oriented concepts and practices that I have canvassed.  
 
Conclusion: Transcultural politics?  
I conceive of politics in a much broader sense than the simple exercise of power 
by the state and its constituent parts. Politics is also expressed through everyday 
events that go beyond the exercise of government power, including all 
relationships between individuals, communities and organisations, including 
cultural or identity-based relationships. In conclusion, I offer a brief comparative 
synthesis through returning to the case of Globalia. In a monoculturalist Globalia, 
the power relationship between those in the cultural or ethnic majority and those 
more identified with minorities would be one of dominance or even violence 
aimed at establishing and maintaining this dominant position within a pluralism 
reduced to its most simple expression. In an interculturalist Globalia, the balance 
of power could shift toward a pattern of strikes and counter strikes between two 
 27 
groups challenging one another for access to power, legitimised cultural status 
and government recognition. It could also produce a more benign form of tension 
between a majority group celebrating their heritage or language, but which is 
underpinned by their representation of others not belonging to the group as 
foreign. For the state, this would result in a validation of the majority group while 
concurrently attempting, within a democratic context, to acknowledge a role for 
minorities. In a multiculturalist Globalia the balance of power would be 
distributed among many groups with state recognition so that there was little or no 
officially recognized dominant or majority status. This would facilitate a pluralist 
framework, within which all communities and individuals could participate. 
Moreover, all groups would be represented politically. This is reflected in the 
Canadian example which supports a non-ethnic, non-identity based perspective, 
that is, one favouring integration in democratic citizenship that promotes the idea 
of ‘us’ in all its diversity (rather than an exclusionary uniqueness as can 
sometimes be seen in the previous models). Finally, in transculturalist Globalia, 
which strives for a thicker form of multiculturalism ( a deep multiculturalism), the 
state would withdraw from any attempt at symbolic representation of those 
cultural groups present, not even necessarily recognising their heritage or identity 
markers as needing expression in the public realm. Rather, it would encourage the 
continuing creation of relationships between apparently different groups, and on 
the fluctuating, lively and unpredictable emergence of composite and shifting 
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cultural identities as an outcome of the encounters and mutual transformation of 
those involved. The Globalian museum or public radio network would therefore 
be instructed not to validate one culture or another, or to legitimise one type of 
folklore or heritage over all others, but instead to encourage practices aimed at 
constructing – from scratch, if necessary – identity based, cultural and artistic 
representations. This would ideally reflect a shifting reality, in which cultures are 
based on an ‘us’; an ‘us’ that is open ended, and continually created, encountered 
and recreated. 
 
Such a fluctuating collective identity is more consistent with the image of 
rhizomes than of roots – a concept developed incisively by Glissant (1990; 1993), 
based on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1976; 1980). These 
concepts posit that rhizomatic identities are sustained by their mutual 
entanglement in an ecology of coevolution and organic (or plant-like) 
coadaptation. Root-like identities, on the other hand, smother their surroundings 
in a manner more akin to that of animal predators. In the final analysis, such a 
framework calls for a critical rethinking about notions of national identity, 
boundaries and the separability of cultures. A reconceptualisation would facilitate 
a better grasp of the resonances and relationships between groups that still appear 
to many observers to be inevitably different, in rivalry or even, at times, 
dangerous. 
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Notes 
1 A Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP Index) recently developed by political scientists Will 
Kymlicka and Keith Banting at Queen’s University evaluates, in 21 Western democracies, the 
evolution of multiculturalism policies through indicators on state-minority relations, and over the 
last 30 years. They find that ‘despite the perception of a backlash and retreat from immigrant 
multiculturalism, the evidence suggests that multiculturalism policies have persisted, and in many 
cases, continue to expand’, at http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/index.html (accessed November 25 
2013) 
 
2 Established since the late 70s, with consltative status with the United Nations, the MRG is an 
international non-governmental network documenting and monitoring the status of minoritie and 
indigenous people in the world : http://www.minorityrights.org/3/home/mrg-directory-
homepage.html (accessed November 25, 2013). 
3  Although the extent of his personal relationships with the Latin American intellectuals who 
developed the founding notions of racial mixing and transculturation remains unclear, we 
nonetheless know that Boas taught Manuel Gamio (1883-1960), who went on to found Mexico's 
National Indigenist Institute (1948). Boas was of the same generation as Fernando Ortiz (1881-
1969), José Vasconcelos (1882-1859) and Oswald de Andrade (1890-1954), each of whom had a 
major influence over the nascent literature on racial and cultural mixing in the Americas. Here, 
Ortiz and Andrade are referenced, but the others are not. About Boas’ influence on Latin 
American scholars and intellectuals, see Benessaieh (2013). 
 
4  Since 1962, following the creation of the CIA in the immediate post-war period (1947), the 
agency's World Factbook has provided an annual and surprisingly detailed (albeit at times rather 
general) description of each country in the world order according to the following criteria (by 
order of appearance in each profile): history, geography, society, peoples (ethnic, cultural, 
religious, demographic and migratory traits), sectors of economic activity, media, military strength 
and transnational issues (that is, border disputes with neighbouring countries, the presence of 
refugees and displaced people within a country's boundaries or the presence of human trafficking). 
See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html#ca  
accessed 25November, 2013. 
 
5  Even when the CIA Worldbook (2012 edition, the most recent one available online) indicates 
such high rates of ethnic homogeneity, one can infer that these are statistical or technical 
generalisations that merit closer examination. For example, Iceland, well-known for its high level 
of racial and ethnic homogeneity, is described in this publication as an ‘homogeneous mixture of 
descendants of Norses and Celts 94%, populations of foreign origins 6%.’ What is striking here is 
the juxtaposition of the terms ‘mixture’ and ‘homogeneous’, which begs the question: how can a 
people be at once mixed or misceginated and at the same time homogeneous? Unless what is being 
suggested here is that this presumed homogeneity (whether ethnic, racial or cultural) is most often 
merely the result of many types of mixing that have occurred over a long period.  
 
 
 30 
 
6  The Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics) states, based on Brazil's 1990 census, that its national population is forty per cent white, 
fifty per cent mixed race, eight per cent black and two per cent composed of other minorities 
including aboriginal peoples, with more than a hundred types of physiological traits existing 
beyond these initial categories, including mixed-race people such as Caboclo or Mameluco (a mix 
of white and aboriginal), Mulato (mixed white and black) and Cafuzo (a mix of aboriginal and 
black). 
 
7  In his inspiring essays on racial mixing and syncretisms as founding dynamics of the New 
World, Grunzinski (1999) describes the settling of the Americas in three great waves which 
essentially took place in the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries and in the 1920s and 1930s. These 
waves originated essentially in Europe and to a lesser degree in China, India and Africa. 
 
8  According to Simon (2008) using the UN’s data, twenty per cent of Canadian and Australian 
populations are immigrants. Together, they are hosting up to twenty per cent of the world’s 
immigration flows. 
 
9  Based on data from Statistics Canada, there are over two hundred languages spoken in the 
country. After English and French, by order of declining importance these are Chinese, Italian, 
German, Punjabi, Arabic, Urdu and Tagaloq (Caron Malenfant, Lebel and Martel 2010). 
 
10 Beyond the two entities mentioned here, the Heritage Department is also responsible for the 
following services, entities, corporations and agencies: Bodies providing special services 
including the Canadian Conservation Institute and the Canadian Heritage Information Network; 
ministerial bodies including Library and Archives Canada, the National Battlefields Commission, 
Status of Women Canada, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission 
and the National Film Board of Canada; state corporations including the National Arts Centre, the 
Canada Council for the Arts, the Canadian Museum of Nature, the Canadian Museum of 
Immigration at Pier 21, the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, the National Gallery of Canada, 
the Museum of Civilization Corporation, the Canada Science and Technology Museums 
Corporation, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Telefilm Canada, an administrative 
tribunal, the Canadian Cultural Property Export Review Board; and, finally, four human resources 
bodies that report to Parliament through the Heritage Department: the Public Service Commission, 
the Public Service Labour Relations Board, the Public Service Staffing Tribunal and the Public 
Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal. This information was found on the PCH website at 
http://www.pch.gc.ca/eng/1266433674232/1266389969960 
Accessed 25 November, 2013.  
 
 
11  BBM, a non-profit entity operating since 1944, regularly publishes survey data on the 
popularity of television shows in Canada and Quebec as well as radio broadcast ratings (data 
available at http://www.bbm.ca/en). Their surveys reveal that in 2011 the shows ‘Tout le monde 
en parle’ and ‘Les enfants de la télé’, whose ethnocultural profiles are both far more homogeneous 
than truly diverse, were among the ten most watched shows in the province. The shows ‘Star 
académie’ and ‘Occupation double’ on the TVA network (a Quebec chain where visible ethnic 
diversity is hardly prominent, at least not yet) beat Radio-Canada in the ratings contest. 
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